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The Chilling Effect of Overprotecting
Factual Narrative Works
by JEE HI PARK*
Introduction
Factual narrative works provide a chronicle of historical
events. Such works range from written biographies to various
other narratives that detail particular events of an era.
Whichever form an author uses to express herself, the work is
afforded copyright protection.' Protection extends, however,
only to the author's expression of the underlying facts or in-
formation regarding a historical event.2 As a result, the fruits
of much effort researching and gathering facts, information,
and ideas are denied protection.
Despite the seeming simplicity of the "idea/expression" di-
chotomy, the application of this concept has been the center of
much recent controversy. Unlike other protected works, 4 fac-
tual narrative works require that copyright law accommodate
two countervailing interests.5 Copyright grants an author
* Member, Third Year Class. An earlier version of this Note received the first
place award in the 1988 Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition at Has-
tings College of the Law, sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP).
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1986).
2. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 203 [D] (1987).
3. This principle was outlined in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) and has
been codified in section 102(b) of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. Section 102(b)
states in part: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1986).
4. Generally, copyright protection extends to
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
.... Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1986).
5. As the existing academic debate demonstrates, the intent of copyright law is
not clear. One scholar argues that an author's monetary award is the real issue in
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monetary incentives to encourage production of creative
works. At the same time, the author's interest is weighed
against the public's interest in gaining access to the underlying
ideas, facts, or information in the protected expression.6
Copyright law straddles the fence and attempts to balance
these interests.
In the past, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals consist-
ently adhered to a scope of protection that allowed liberal ac-
cess to the underlying facts and information within
copyrighted works. Despite numerous attempts to forego this
policy, the Circuit repeatedly upheld liberal standards to fos-
ter developing historical and biographical works. A recent
Second Circuit case, Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,7 reverses
this trend by implicitly broadening the scope of an author's
copyright protection.
This Note asserts that two standards of copyrightability ex-
ist and apply to factual narrative works. Unlike other narra-
tives, biographies have recently been held to a more restrictive
standard. This restrictive standard acts as a prohibitive hurdle
to writing and publishing biographies, contrary to the intent of
the copyright law. This Note argues that the copyrightability
standard announced in Salinger overprotects the subject au-
thor's copyrighted work, and suggests three reasons to apply a
narrow scope of protection to all factual narratives.
I
Background
A. The Purpose of Copyright Law
The copyright clause of the Constitution empowers Con-
most copyright cases, rather than constitutional principles embodied in the copyright
law. See 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) at 118 (Dec. 11, 1986). As a re-
sult, he suggests a system of property ownership granting exclusive copyright to au-
thors. W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (1985).
Another scholar argues that copyright law serves a regulatory function to encourage
distributing information rather than to give exclusive rights to authors. Patterson,
Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987).
6. "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our prede-
cessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
himself.'" Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511
(1945).
7. 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
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gress to grant authors exclusive rights for a limited time.8
This monopoly is offered to foster the creative efforts of au-
thors. At the same time, copyright law gives the public access
to the underlying ideas and facts. This bilateral approach at-
tempts to foster current developments in the arts while al-
lowing subsequent artists to build on existing ideas.
Some have argued that the primary purpose of copyright
law is to facilitate providing information to the public.9 By
giving authors monetary incentives to create new works, the
public ultimately benefits from the increased pool of informa-
tion and knowledge within the public domain. 10 Thus, the
purpose of copyright-to promote learning-is best served by
encouraging distribution and allowing public access to infor-
mation. 1 Others argue that expression flourishes only in the
absence of government restraints.1 2 One commentator sug-
gests that the real issue in most copyright cases is an author's
monetary award and not the constitutional principles embod-
ied in the copyright law.13 He suggests implementing a system
of property ownership by granting exclusive copyright to
authors. 4
The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 was the most recent leg-
islative attempt to codify the ideals underlying the copyright
clause.' 5 The Act employs two distinct doctrines to reconcile
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states, "The Congress shall have Power ... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries ......
Section 106 of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 permits a copyright owner to
prepare derivative works, and to reproduce, distribute, perform, and publicly display
his work subject to the limitations in §§ 107-18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1986). The lim-
ited time is generally a life-time plus 50 years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1986).
9. Interplay between Copyright and First Amendment Debate, 33 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) at 118 (Dec. 11, 1986); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
... copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors .... ");
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("[T]he greater the potential for economic reward, the greater the incentive to create
new works.").
10. See generally Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 503 (1945); Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 569 (1982).
11. Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987).
12. W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (1985).
13. 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 118 (Dec. 11, 1986).
14. W. PATRY, supra note 12, at 462.
15. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976) is the most
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the competing interests of authors and the public: (1) the idea/
expression dichotomy and (2) the fair use doctrine.
B. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy limits the scope of copyright
protection to an author's expression.16 This doctrine allows
the underlying ideas, information, or facts conveyed in pro-
tected expression to be freely used. Thus, a subsequent author
may use, without restraint, the unprotectable information con-
veyed in a copyrighted work.
Application of this doctrine, however, requires defining the
parameters of protected expression. Courts attempt to distin-
guish an author's expression from facts and information in the
public domain. Defining the bounds of expression thus deter-
mines whether or not an infringing use occurred.17 As a re-
sult, in factual narrative works, determining the threshold of
copyrightability of an author's work plays a paramount role in
copyright cases..8  In addition to the idea/expression dichot-
omy, the fair use doctrine allows a subsequent author to use
otherwise protected expression in certain instances.' 9
C. The Fair Use Doctrine
Considered to be the "most troublesome" copyright con-
cept,2 ° the fair use doctrine was codified in the 1976 Act.21 It is
generally defined as the "privilege in others than the owner of
the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
recent in a long series of revisions. The initial copyright statute was passed as Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). Since then, the Act has been changed four
times: Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16
Stat. 198 (1870); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); and the Copyright
Revision Act of 1976, supra. Each of these statutes has been based on the copyright
clause of the Constitution. See supra note 8.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1986).
17. More prohibitive interpretation of the expression parameters would allow
greater use of the previously copyrighted work. Conversely, a more liberal line-
drawing of expression would prohibit using the ideas and facts within the copy-
righted work.
18. Copyright law protects "original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1986). The standard of originality does not require "novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic
merit." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1986).
20. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
21. "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work . . .is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1986).
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manner without his consent."22 It accommodates instances of
subsequent authors' infringing uses of another's protected
expression.23 Section 107 of the 1976 Act states, in pertinent
part: "Factors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose
and character of the use... ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work. ' 24  The four factors in section 107 were not
meant to serve as exclusive considerations in determining fair
use.25 Rather, other relevant factors were intended to be in-
corporated in applying this doctrine.26 In conjunction with the
idea/expression dichotomy, the fair use doctrine exists to ac-
commodate the competing interests present in the works of
factual narratives.
D. The Past Application of the Two Doctrines to Works of
Factual Narratives
Through these doctrines, copyright law attempts to foster
the "development of historical and biographical works and
their public distribution. '27 For example, in Hoehling v. Uni-
versal Studios, Inc. ,28 the Second Circuit found that an au-
thor's narrative account of a historical event is not protected
by copyright law.29 The court held that no infringement ex-
isted when an author wrote a movie script based on Hoehling's
written account of the Hindenburg disaster.3 0 This' decision
implicitly distinguished protectable expression from the un-
protectable underlying information conveyed in the author's
22. H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944), cited in
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966);
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
23. In Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1946), the Second Circuit defined
the standard for infringement. First, access and similarity to the copyrighted work
must exist. Once copying is proven, "illicit copying" that was not permissible must
be shown.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1986).
25. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] (1988).
26. Id.
27. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd,
803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
28. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. Id. at 979.
30. Id.
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expression. Thus, the use of information in the author's nar-
rative was allowed to be used by a subsequent writer.
The importance of nurturing factual narrative works along
with expression is further illustrated in Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc. 31 The case involved a biography of
Howard Hughes prepared from various sources, including arti-
cles from Look magazine. Prior to the release of the unau-
thorized biography, Hughes acquired the copyright to the
previously published articles by acquiring the publisher of
Look. The district court suppressed the publication of the bi-
ography based on Hughes' ownership of copyright.32 The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, reversed the district court decision,
noting that a biography is an important source for discovering
the "social, economic and political forces of the particular era
involved."33 It held that no copyright protection exists in a
"narration of historical events" and allowed publication of the
biography. 4
Another attempt to suppress the use of biographical infor-
mation is found in Meeropol v. Nizer.3 5 This case involved let-
ters written by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg while awaiting
their execution for treason. The letters were subsequently
copyright registered by the Rosenberg children. When the
contents of the letters were used in a historical account of the
Rosenbergs, the children pressed an infringement claim
against the defendants. They argued that their parents' letters
were an "intellectual product . . . [of] high literary value"
which warranted protection under the copyright law.3 6 By cat-
egorizing the letters as a "unique intellectual product," the
copyright holder attempted to avoid the limited scope of pro-
tection afforded to factual narrative works. The court found
that a scholarly work exists whenever there is "some serious
attempt to describe a historical event" and denied a greater
scope of protection.38 The subsequent author was permitted to
31. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
32. Rosemont, 256 F. Supp. 55, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
33. 366 F.2d at 309 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. Id. at 306.
35. 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
36. Id. at 1211.
37. Id. at 1213. See generally Taylor, The Uncopyrightability of Historical Mat-
ter: Protecting Form Over Substance and Fiction Over Fact, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 33 (1983).
38. 417 F. Supp. at 1209.
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use the underlying information in the letters.3 9
The foregoing examples illustrate the Second Circuit's prior
recognition of the importance of fostering historical works.
Copyright law afforded only limited protection to copyrighted
factual narrative works. This limited protection allowed sub-
sequent authors to use the facts and information in protected
expression. Such a policy, however, is not so clearly outlined
in the recent cases.
II
Inconsistent Recent Decisions
Despite the previous rulings that allowed no protection to
narratives of historical events, recent cases have not followed
suit. The recent decisions accept the prevailing policy that
only the expression of ideas, facts, or information is protected.
However, these decisions are not uniform in defining pro-
tected expression. The problem is especially acute where the
underlying information is "wedded" to one's expression.4 °
Recent cases demonstrate the inconsistencies that stem
from delineating the legal parameters of protectable expres-
sion and unprotectable ideas, facts, and information. These
cases are presented in the following sections.
A. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell
In Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell,41 the plaintiff inter-
viewed women about their experiences and reactions to un-
wanted pregnancies. Maxtone-Graham compiled the results of
the anonymous interviews in a "Pro-Choice" book.42 Subse-
quent to the book's publication, Burtchaell asked for permis-
39. Id. at 1214.
40. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1196-99 (1970); Denicola, Copyright
and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 283, 293 (1979); Goldwag, Copyright Infringement and the First Amend-
ment, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 45 (1984). But see Hill, Copyright Protection
for Historical Research: A Defense of the Minority View, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 45 (1984). Professor Nimmer recognized such confrontation in the works
of graphic artists. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10 [C][2] (1986). See also
Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (recognizing the problem with
"wedded ideas" in letters).
41. 631 F. Supp. 1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986).
42. Entitled PREGNANT BY MISTAKE, it was intended to "further understanding
of the Pro-Choice view." 631 F. Supp. at 1433.
1988]
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sion to use certain passages in his own "Pro-Life" book.
Maxtone-Graham denied Burtchaell's request because she did
not approve of Burtchaell's intended use.43 Nevertheless, the
words were incorporated in Burtchaell's book.44 The district
court allowed Burtchaell's use of approximately 7000 words in
an essay of 37,000 words.45 It found fair use in Burtchaell's
infringing uses because the book "compliment[ed]" Maxtone-
Graham's book.46
The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that fair use was in-
tended to encourage authors to critique and comment on an-
other's work.47  Because Burtchaell's book served an
educational function, the court allowed the use. It distin-
guished between uses that "advance learning" from those that
"exploit" the first author's work.4" The court justified its deci-
sion based on the "relevant content" of the subsequent au-
thor's work.49  By characterizing the subsequent author's
purpose as educational, the court found fair use despite the
extensive "borrowing" of copyrighted work.
B. Salinger v. Random House, Inc.
Less than 'three weeks after Maxtone-Graham was handed
down, Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 50 was decided by the
district court. J.D. Salinger, a well-known reclusive author,
alleged copyright infringement of letters he had written to
various friends. Unbeknownst to Salinger, some of the recipi-
ents had donated the letters to university libraries. Hamilton,
a biographer, located these letters and wrote J.D. Salinger: A
Writing Life. Hamilton's biography quoted about 200 to 300
words, only 0.8% to 2.0% of Salinger's letters. Hamilton also
43. The book, RACHEL WEEPING, Burtchaell concedes is an "attempt to make a
nondogmatic scholarly argument on behalf of the Pro-Life viewpoint." Id. at 1437.
44. He relied on the publisher's legal counsel's opinion that the use of Maxtone-
Graham's words was within fair use of the copyrighted material. Id. at 1433.
45. Id. at 1437. The district court judge defended the substantial use of direct
quotations on the basis that "to write persuasively and without arousing the suspi-
cion of the reader, he felt obliged to quote, rather than paraphrase, the words of the
so-called 'abortion-veterans' interviewed by plaintiff .... Id.
46. Id. at 1438. The court noted that "[o]bjection by a quoted author to the view-
point espoused by the subsequent user is simply not relevant to an inquiry into the
lawfulness of that use under the Fair Use doctrine." Id.
47. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
48. Id. at 1259.
49. Post Issuance Challenges is Theme of AIPLA Meeting, Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) at 375 (Feb. 19, 1987).
50. 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
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paraphrased numerous passages, but "no more than 10% of
any letter. '51  Based on this use, Salinger instituted an in-
fringement claim.
The district court found that Salinger's "thoughts and feel-
ings" conveyed in the letters were of historical value. 2 As a
result, this information was not afforded protection. The
court found fair use of approximately thirty instances of direct
quotes and "close paraphrases" otherwise protected by Salin-
ger's copyright.53 It determined that the biography was a work
of "social and educational value" meant to be protected by
copyright law.54 Finally, the court characterized Salinger's
real claim as the loss of privacy resulting from the biogra-
phy.55 The court held that "the copyright law does not give
him protection against that form of injury"56 and denied the
claim of infringement. Salinger appealed.
The Second Circuit reversed and held that the paraphrased
material in the biography was protected by Salinger's copy-
right.5 7 The court held that protected expression is appropri-
ated regardless of whether it is quoted verbatim or
paraphrased. Expression was said to include "clich6s and ordi-
nary word combinations" which are not generally copyright-
able.5 8  Nonetheless, it found that where a "sequence of
creative expression" incorporates such phrases, protection is
given to the entire passage.59 Originality is recognized, the
51. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
52. Id. at 418.
53. Id. at 419-20. The court defined "close paraphrases" as passages which appro-
priate an "author's own original image, choice of words and turn of phrase."
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id. at 426. See Margolick, Whose Words Are They, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES
BOOK REV., Nov. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (claim that the infringement action was insti-
tuted to protect Salinger's privacy). But see Delbanco, Holden Caulfield Goes to Law
School, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1987, at 27 (claim that the biography did not invade
Salinger's privacy). For a discussion of privacy suits that stem from use of personal
letters, see Note, Personal Letters: A Dilemma for Copyright and Privacy Law, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 134 (1980).
56. Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 426. See also Rosemont, 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir.
1966) ("It has never been the purpose of the copyright law to restrict the dissemina-
tion of information about persons in the public eye even though those concerned
may not welcome the resulting publicity.") (Lombard, J., concurring); Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 247 (1903) ("The copyright does not pro-
tect what is immoral in its tendency.").
57. Salinger, 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987).
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id. Compare this language to the "selection and arrangement" standard that
allowed copyright protection in data compilation cases. The issue of whether factual
1988]
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court reasoned, in an author's "association, presentation, and
combination of the ideas and thought. ' 6' By lowering the
threshold of copyrightability, the court found substantially
greater instances of infringement. Consequently, the fair use
defense was denied.61
Salinger presents an enhanced standard of copyright-
ability.62  It equates close paraphrasing with verbatim quota-
tion. Without proposing an objective standard to differentiate
non-infringing paraphrase from infringing paraphrase, the
court found infringement. By holding that Salinger's "associa-
tion, presentation, and combination of ideas" merited copy-
right protection,63 the court increased protection to the
copyright holder. Consequently, ideas are not allowed to be
divorced from their expression. Underlying ideas in an au-
thor's expressions are thus monopolized and the public is de-
nied access to them.
It is difficult to reconcile Salinger with the holding in
Maxtone-Graham. In Salinger, an author's "association, pres-
entation, and combination" of ideas and thoughts were given
copyright protection.64 In Maxtone-Graham, however, the au-
thor exerted energy in gathering information.65  Despite
narratives are afforded such protection for an author's labor is resolved differently
in Hearn v. Meyer, infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
60. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97. Reversal was ordered despite the district court's
meticulous categorization of different types of passages: "an infringing quotation, an
infringing paraphrase, a non-infringing quotation (because Salinger was quoting
someone else or because the quoted words were a clich6), a non-infringing report of
historical facts, or a non-infringing report of ideas." Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 419.
61. 811 F.2d at 100. In its fair use analysis, the Second Circuit applied the
Supreme Court's holding in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, Inc., 471 U.S. 539
(1985), that "unpublished letters normally enjoy insulation from fair use." Id. at 95.
The result differed greatly from the district court's interpretation that the "unpub-
lished nature of a work is [a] key, though not necessarily determinative, factor tend-
ing to negate a defense of fair use." 650 F. Supp. at 421 (emphasis in original). See
infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
62. Rinzler, A Busy Summer for Copyright Law, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Sep. 11,
1987, at 25.
63. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98.
64. Id. at 98 (citing Nutt v. National Institute, Inc. for the Improvement of Mem-
ory, 31 F.2d 236, 237 (2d Cir. 1929)). This is contrary to an early opinion by Judge
Learned Hand in Myers v. Mail & Express Co., 36 C.O. Bull. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
It states: "[T]here cannot be any such thing as copyright in the order of presentation
of the facts, nor, indeed, in their selection." See also 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.11[E] (1987), as cited in Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), discussed infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
65. Interviews with 17 women were tape recorded and transcripts were pre-
pared. To avoid repetition and verbiage, the transcript was edited. Maxtone-Gra-
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Maxtone-Graham's efforts in compiling her book, Burtchaell
prevailed in the fair use defense, even though he used the
copyrighted material extensively. Thus, Burtchaell's intent to
use the original work extensively to convey the protected ex-
pression with "accuracy" and "vividness" survived the court's
scrutiny in the fair use analysis. On the other hand, in Salin-
ger, Hamilton's use of a limited number of paraphrased
passages for the exact same purpose was denied fair use.66 In
addition, the court in Maxtone-Graham examined the merits
of Burtchaell's work. It found a fulfillment of educational
function in Burtchaell's book, rather than an "exploitation"6 7
of the original author's function. Because of its meritorious
contribution to literary resources, the court allowed Burt-
chaell's misappropriations. If merit were a factor, however,
there would be a stronger fair use argument supporting Ham-
ilton's use of 300 words in his book, found to have been of "so-
cial and educational value."68 It is clear that Salinger and
Maxtone-Graham are not consistent in their application of
copyright principles.
C. Hearn v. Meyer
Inconsistencies continue in the Second Circuit. In Hearn v.
Meyer,6 9 the court held that no infringement existed in the de-
fendant's paraphrases of passages from "A Treasury of the
Great Children's Illustrators. ' 70 The court denied relief to the
plaintiff because the common facts paraphrased by the defend-
ham, 803 F.2d at 1256. Under the "selection and arrangement" standard, this process
should have been given copyright protection. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,
Inc., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984) (quoting 1 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at § 211[E] (1987).
66. Hamilton contended that Salinger's stylistic device was copied to avoid mak-
ing a "pedestrian sentence [that he] didn't wish to put [his] name to." Salinger, 811
F.2d at 96. In response to this, the Second Circuit found that a "biographer has no
inherent right to copy the 'accuracy' or the 'vividness' of the letter writer's expres-
sion." Id. But see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
67. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1259.
68. Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 423. See also Delbanco, supra note 55, at 27 (A
scholar suggests that Hamilton's book "offers speculation ... on the interplay be-
tween the writer's art and his life" without impermissibly revealing Salinger's reclu-
sive personality.).
69. 664 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). This case was decided on July 20, 1987,
more than 2 months after the Salinger case, which was decided by the Second Cir-
cuit on May 4, 1987.
70. Hearn, 664 F. Supp. at 847-48.
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ant could only be stated in a limited number of ways. 71 The
plaintiff argued, however, that copyright protection should ex-
tend to her efforts in selecting and arranging the facts. 72 The
plaintiff attempted to extend the scope of copyright protection
by arguing that the work was a "factual compilation" rather
than a narrative.73 The court rejected this argument and
found the work to be a "historical and artistic interpreta-
tion. ' 74  This suggests that the proper standard was the one
outlined in Hoehling v. Universal Studios, Inc.75 In refusing
to grant copyright protection, the court reaffirmed the public's
interest in the "development of historical and biographical
works and their public distribution. "76
Finding no infringement, the Hearn court aligned itself with
prior decisions that held such public benefit to be the primary
purpose of the copyright law.Y The court purposely allowed
Hearn's expression a lesser degree of protection. A subse-
quent author may use the information conveyed in a copy-
righted work. This result, however, is inconsistent with the
court's view in Salinger, where such information was held pro-
tected and outside of fair use. 78 Within a few months, a dis-
71. Id. at 847.
72. Id. at 852. Plaintiff relied on Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d
Cir. 1984) which stated that while research efforts have not been protected, the
"cases do not hold that subjective selection and arrangement of information does not
merit protection." Id. at 862.
73. Hearn, 664 F. Supp. at 852.
74. Id.
75. 618 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1980). The court held that where "the idea at issue is an
interpretation of an historical event, our cases hold that such interpretations are not
copyrightable as a matter of law. A broad latitude must be granted to subsequent
authors . . . [t]o avoid a chilling effect on authors who contemplate tackling an his-
torical issue or event." The Hoehling court noted other circuits that gave protection
to research. See Toksvig v. Bruce Publications Corp., 181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir.
1950); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978); but see
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing the
district court and holding that research is not protected under copyright law). The
Second Circuit expressly affirmed the Fifth Circuit: "[W]e refuse to subscribe to the
view that an author is absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by referring
to and relying upon prior published material .... It is just such wasted effort that
the proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts... [is] designed to prevent."
Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979 (citing Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310 and 1 M. NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11 (1979)).
76. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978 (citing Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307).
77. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
78. Salinger, 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987). One may argue that an author's ef-
forts in arranging encompass "association, presentation, and combination" of facts.
Selection requires research and a gathering process that requires significant time
and effort. The Second Circuit decisions may be distinguished because the arranging
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trict court in the Second Circuit offered factual narrative
works a conflicting scope of protection.79 Thus, concurrent en-
dorsement of two copyrightability standards exists in the Sec-
ond Circuit.
D. Craft v. Kobler
Less than three weeks after the Hearn decision, a biography
of Igor Stravinsky was enjoined from publication in Craft v.
Kobler.s° In this case the court found the author's use of the
plaintiff's works too extensive and important to support the
claim of fair use."' The court found eighty-nine infringing
passages.8 2 Ten passages were held to "sufficiently track or
emulate the manner of expression. 8 3 In the other quoted
passages, the court found that they contained "startlingly ex-
pressive phrases" of Stravinsky and denied fair use.8 4 The dis-
trict court based its injunction, in part, on Salinger.
The increased instances of infringing uses may be attributed
to the standard of copyrightability outlined in Salinger. Be-
cause a copyright holder enjoys a greater scope of protection, a
and selecting involve less mental process than an author's "association, presentation,
and combination" of facts. However, one cannot altogether discount the mental pro-
cess involved in arranging and selecting facts through editing and subjective deter-
minations in compiling facts.
79. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Hearn was decided on July
20, 1987, and Craft was decided on August 6, 1987.
80. 667 F. Supp. 120, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Entitled FIREBIRD, the biography bor-
rowed from previous works authored and co-authored by the plaintiff, Robert Craft,
a noted scholar on Stravinsky.
81. Id. Judge Leval, who found fair use in Salinger at the district court level,
was the same judge who found Kobler's infringement use not fair. As Stravinsky's
"personal assistant and closest intellectual and musical confidant," id. at 122, Craft
authored and co-authored numerous books and articles on Stravinsky. See Amended
Complaint, Craft v. Kobler, 87 Civ. 2601 (PNL) at 2 (July 16, 1987) for an index of
Craft's writings. Upon Stravinsky's death, Craft inherited many of Stravinsky's
copyrights, and the infringement action asserts Craft's ownership against 167 alleged
infringing uses. Craft, 667 F. Supp. at 122.
82. These include 10 closely paraphrased passages that "appropriate the craft" of
the original author and 79 which are direct quotations. Any additional infringing
paraphrases that are "subject to reasonable disagreement" were not considered in
the court's fair use analysis. Craft, 667 F. Supp. at 124-125.
83. Id. at 124. Judge Leval denies finding. a greater number of infringing
passages as a result of Salinger, which held that "where the accused passage draws
unprotected history from the protected work, the fact that the narration of events is
structured in the same order although by different words and expression has been
found to justify a conclusion of 'close paraphrase' and infringement . Id. at 125
(citing Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98; 818 F.2d at 254).
84. Craft, 667 F. Supp. at 127.
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subsequent author risks a greater likelihood of infringing
copyrighted works. Enlarging the parameters of protected ex-
pression thus increases infringing instances. Fair use is denied
because of the increased risk of misappropriating copyrighted
material. A biographer, then, "may frequently have to [re-
port] only the fact[s]" so as to minimize the consequences of
an infringement claim.85
While Salinger only addressed the copyrightability standard,
it had a great impact on infringement analysis. Salinger effec-
tively extended the parameters of expression by granting pro-
tection to ideas that are wedded to one's expression. 6 A
biographer is now forced to choose: use protected expression
to convey accuracy and vividness and risk an injunction, as in
Craft, or rely only on the bare facts in the expression and be
safe from infringing. This result implicates policy that begs
for judicial determination or legislative action.
III
Adopt a Consistent and Uniform Scope of
Protection
In Salinger and Craft, only the bare facts contained in the
author's expression were allowed to be appropriated by a sub-
sequent author. In Maxtone-Graham and Hearn, however, the
subsequent author was allowed greater access to the protected
material. Clearly, two standards of copyrightability are ap-
plied to factual narrative works. Perhaps the courts are infor-
mally assessing the original author's expertise and past
accomplishments in making their decisions. It seems, in any
case, that an unspoken exception to the copyrightability stan-
dard exists that increases protection for works of highly re-
garded authors.
The costs of this increased scope of protection are high. The
ideas underlying factual narratives are not allowed to be di-
vorced from protected expression. The public is denied access
to information contained in narrations of historical events.
Since the Salinger decision, Macmillan Publishing has with-
drawn a biography by David Chandler entitled The Binghams
of Louisville." If this trend continues, it may deprive the pub-
85. Id. at 128 (citing Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96-97).
86. Id.
87. Rinzler, A Busy Summer for Copyright Law, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Sep. 11,
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lic of biographies that depict the "social, economic and polit-
ical forces" of our era.88
The impact of Salinger on the publishing industry is decid-
edly contrary to the intent of the copyright law. Rather than
encouraging and fostering creative works, Salinger has a chil-
ling effect. This Note proposes three reasons to limit the Sa-
linger scope of protection afforded to biographies.
A. There is a Narrow Scope of Fair Use as a Result of Harper
& Row v. Nation Enterprises, Inc.
The first reason to limit the scope of protection is Supreme
Court precedent. In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,
Inc.,8 9 the Supreme Court ruled that the heart of a copy-
righted book had been appropriated and rejected the fair use
defense for passages used in a magazine article.90 The Nation
magazine had acquired a purloined copy of President Ford's
then unpublished memoirs. The Nation intended to use ex-
cerpts in an article prior to the book's release. President
Ford's publisher, Harper & Row, instituted an infringement
suit and argued that the passages misappropriated by The Na-
tion were protected by copyright. Despite the factual informa-
tion contained in the memoirs, plaintiffs reasoned that
expression encompasses more than mere verbatim repetition;
they asserted that "the author's arrangements of factual mate-
rial" were protected.91 The Nation argued that the govern-
ment documents used by President Ford to compile the
memoirs lacked originality and, therefore, could not be copy-
righted. They also cautioned against extending protection to
information or ideas that are wedded to protected
expression.
9 2
Without determining whether the material appropriated
was protected expression, the Court ruled on the issue of fair
use based on The Nation's concession to having infringed.93 In
1987, at 25. "A lawyer for Bingham was quoted as saying that the copyright theory
with which he seized Macmillan's concerned attention... was 'following the parade
from Salinger.'" Id.
88. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 308.
89. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
90. Id. at 565.
91. Kennedy, Amicus Curiae Briefs: Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 9
ART & LAW 253, 258 (1985).
92. Id. at 261.
93. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 548. But see 471 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, J.,
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interpreting section 107, the Court found a presumption of
"unfair exploitation" in "every commercial use" of copy-
righted material.94 Because The Nation was unable to over-
come this presumption, the Court found that The Nation's use
constituted "clear-cut evidence of actual damage."95
The decision met with mixed response. Some lauded the de-
cision as a "victory for the copyright holder and copyright pro-
tection."96 One commentator agreed with the Court's decision
because The Nation's article was not of "overriding impor-
tance" to the public. 97 Others, however, cautioned that an au-
thor's rights had been expanded to an extent that jeopardized
public access to the underlying information.98 To ameliorate
the broadened scope of protection under the Court's interpre-
tation of fair use, one commentator suggested that copyright
protection extend only to the "ordering and choice of words."99
Through this limited standard of copyrightability, instances of
infringing uses could be reduced; thus, the expansive interpre-
tation of fair use in Nation Enterprises could be overcome. 100
Because Salinger broadened the standard of copyrightability
of protected expression, the argument to streamline the ef-
fects of Nation Enterprises is relevant and appropriate.
B. The Creative Process Requires Access to Previous Works
The second reason to limit the scope of protection is to fur-
ther society's interest in creative endeavors. It has been stated
dissenting) for the proposition that copyrightability must be determined first. See
generally Francione, Facing The Nation: The Standards for Copyright, Infringe-
ment, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1986) for criticisms of
the Court's analysis.
94. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 562 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
95. Id. at 567.
96. Changes in Intellectual Property Law are Assessed During Recent Confer-
ences, 32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) at 34 (May 8, 1986).
97. Goroff, Fair Use and Unpublished Works: Harper & Row v. Nation Enter-
prises, 9 ART & LAw 325, 349-50 (1985).
98. Note, When Fair is Foul: A Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 218, 218
(1986); Francione, supra note 93, at 519; Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987). Some contend that Nation Enterprises was about
"whether the public would be able to read the material . . .in an authorized or
unauthorized edition." W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 472
(1985).
99. Francione, supra note 93, at 527 (quoting Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d at
204).
100. Id. at 598.
[Vol. 11:75
FACTUAL NARRATIVE WORKS
that "a work of art is a likeness or reproduction of an original,
and not a symbolic representation of it."''1 A work of art is
not a sterile production that springs wholly from a creator's
efforts. By giving protection to Salinger's "stylistic de-
vice[s],' 1 °2 the Salinger decision allows a scope of copyright
protection that cannot coexist with the historic cultural prem-
ise that "borrowing is and always has been an integral part of
the creative process. ' ' The Second Circuit's finding that a
subsequent author cannot make use of a copyrighted author's
stylistic approaches is contrary to the general view of literary
scholars that imitation is inherent in art. The court's reason-
ing ignores the importance of imitation1 0 4 and the influence an
author's work has on subsequent works.1
05
In Salinger, the biographer repeatedly objected to writing
"pedestrian" sentences.' Hamilton acknowledged that the
strong influence of Salinger's writing style had permeated the
paraphrased passages. 107 Denying the stylistic influence of
previous authors by judicial order is contrary to the histori-
cally accepted creative process that allows influence and imita-
tion from one creator to another. The Second Circuit's
approach, protecting Salinger's "literary devices," does not fos-
ter, but rather chills creative works.'
C. The Biographer Evades the Effects of the Court's Ruling
The final reason to limit protection is that a broad scope
may be evaded by abuse of the litigation process itself. Some
commentators have complained that courts "are turning copy-
right into some bastardized form of misappropriation law."'10 9
After the lengthy trial, another version of the Hamilton biog-
raphy, In Search of J.D. Salinger, was released."10 The de-
101. S. BUTCHER, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF POETRY AND FINE ART 124 (1951).
102. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96.
103. A. LINDSEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 63 (1952).
104. "The term 'fine art' is not one that has been transmitted to us from the
Greeks. Their phrase was the 'imitative arts' . . . 'modes of imitation' . .. or some-
times the 'liberal arts.' Imitation [is] the common characteristic of the fine arts." S.
BUTCHER, supra note 101, at 121.
105. "Influence is the cement that binds together the bricks and stones of the
monument that is our cultural heritage." A. LINDSEY, Supra note 103, at 40.
106. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97.
107. Id. at 96.
108. Id. at 97.
109. Fair Use, 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 375 (Feb. 19, 1987).
110. McDowell, Writer, Twice Restrained, Has New Salinger Book, N.Y. Times,
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fense to an infringement action for this volume could be fair
use, which allows use of copyrighted works for "purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . .scholar-
ship, or research.""'
Throughout the trial, while the biographer's impermissible
use of Salinger's letters was under judicial scrutiny, the dis-
puted passages had much public exposure. The district court
opinion generously quoted the allegedly infringing passages to
compare them with the originals." 2  Newspapers and
magazines also published commentaries and reports which
further disseminated the infringing passages."3 The result is
that the court's attempt to stop the dissemination of infringing
passages backfired. Infringing passages, now within public do-
main as a result of the law suit, and disseminated by the
courts and reporters, are available for use by biographers." 4
Clearly, the purpose of copyright law is perverted when the
act of trying an infringement suit overcomes statutory hurdles
for subsequent authors. The standard of copyrightability out-
lined in Salinger, however, seems to have precisely this result,
encouraging evasion of legislative edicts enacted in copyright
law and undermining the integrity of the judicial process.
Conclusion
The existing statutory scheme provides means to accommo-
date the public's access to ideas and information conveyed in
protected expression. Salinger and its progeny, however, have
caused uncertainty in defining the threshold of copyright-
ability by denying access to the ideas entwined with expres-
sion. The decision creates confused exceptions to an otherwise
clear policy-that facts are not copyrightable. The result is
uncertainty and unpredictability in Second Circuit copyright
law which previously encouraged the dissemination of ideas in
protected works. The result permeates the copyright law and
has a chilling effect on biographical works. Rather than per-
petuate the existing confusion, Salinger v. Random House,
Feb. 19, 1988, at 34, col. 2. Described as a "substantially new book," it is said to
incorporate the earlier version of the book and actually reveals more about Salinger
than the previously banned version. Id.
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1986).
112. See Salinger, 650 F. Supp. 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
113. See Margolick, supra note 55, at 1, col. 1; Delbanco, supra note 55, at 27.
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1986).
[Vol. 11:75
1988] FACTUAL NARRATIVE WORKS 93
Inc. should be reversed, and a consistent, limited scope of pro-
tection should be applied to all factual narrative works.

